NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 68 | Number 6

Article 1

9-1-1990

Judicially Imposed Usury Penalties in the Absence
of Statutory Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract
Co-Exist with Public Policy after Merritt v. Knox
Susan Pannell McAllister

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Susan P. McAllister, Judicially Imposed Usury Penalties in the Absence of Statutory Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract Co-Exist with Public
Policy after Merritt v. Knox, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1021 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss6/1

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Judicially Imposed Usury Penalties in the Absence of Statutory
Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract Co-Exist with Public
Policy After Merritt v. Knox?
Since 1741 the North Carolina General Assembly and judiciary have provided and enforced penalties against lenders who attempt to exact interest at
usurious' rates from borrowers. 2 North Carolina's usury penalties are subject to
a two-year statute of limitations, 3 however, and thus force borrowers to seek
judicial relief within this period or risk losing the protections afforded under the
law.4 Usurious lenders face no other statutory penalty for usury once the limita5
tions period has expired.
Economists and legal commentators are critical of usury laws for unnecessarily restricting parties' freedom of contract and exerting a restraining influence
on the commercial marketplace. 6 Proponents of usury laws staunchly support
these laws and the public policy behind their enactment of protecting unsophisti1. It is well-settled that to establish a transaction as usurious, the borrower must affirmatively

plead and prove: (1) there was a loan, (2) there was an understanding that the borrower would
return the money lent, (3) the lender charged a greater rate of interest for the loan than allowed by
law, and (4) there was corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate for the use of money. Bagri v.
Desai, 83 N.C. App. 150, 151, 349 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1986) (citing Kessing v. National Mortgage
Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 530, 180 S.E.2d 823, 827 (1971)), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 102, 353 S.E.2d 103
(1987); see, eg., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366, af'd on
rehearing,304 N.C. 191, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273
N.C. 253, 263, 160 S.E.2d 39, 46 (1968); Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 338, 132
S.E.2d 692, 693-94 (1963); Preyer v. Parker, 257 N.C. 440,444, 125 S.E.2d 916, 918-19 (1962); Perry
v. Doub, 249 N.C. 322, 327, 106 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1959); Bailey v. Inman, 224 N.C. 571, 573, 31
S.E.2d 769, 770 (1944); Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 341, 67 S.E. 754, 755 (1910). The element
of corrupt intent is "simply the intentional charging of more for money lent than the law allows."
Kessing, 278 N.C. at 530, 180 S.E.2d at 827 (citing Associated Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Loan & Inv.
Co., 202 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd, 326 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 379 U.S.
830 (1964)). Courts will imply corrupt intent when the first three elements are apparent on the face
of the contract. See id. ("Where the lender intentionally charges the borrower a greater rate of
interest than the law allows and his purpose is clearly revealed on the face of the instrument, a
corrupt intent to violate the usury law on the part of the lender is shown."); Planter's Nat'l Bank v.
Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N.C. 380, 386, 99 S.E. 199, 202-03 (1919); MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 26, 80 S.E. 184, 185 (1913); Charles A. Riley & Co. v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C.
509, 520-21, 70 S.E. 997, 1001 (1911); Comment, Usury Law in North Carolina,47 N.C.L. REv. 761,
773 (1969). Treatise writers developed the four components of a usurious transaction and courts
widely accept them as the essential elements of usury. See Comment, supra at 772 n.62.
2. North Carolina's first usury statute was the Act of 1741. Act of 1741, ch. 28, Potter's
Revisal of 1819, (repealed 1837). For a discussion of the historical development of North Carolina's
usury statutes, see infra note 47.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53(2), (3) (1983). The statute of limitations runs from the date of
payment for the double-recovery remedy and from the date of the contract for the forfeiture remedy.
Merritt v. Knox, 94 N.C. App. 340, 342, 380 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1989) (citing Haanebrink v. Meyer, 47

N.C. App. 646, 648-49, 267 S.E.2d 598, 599-600 (1980)).
4. See Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253, 264, 160 S.E.2d 39, 47
(1968); Woody v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 364, 365, 183 S.E. 296, 297 (1936) (per curiam);
Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N.C. 478, 482, 181 S.E. 242, 245 (1935); Smith v. Finance Co. of Am., 207
N.C. 367, 369, 177 S.E. 183, 183 (1934); Farmer's Bank & Trust Co. v. Redwine, 204 N.C. 125, 128,
167 S.E. 687, 689 (1933); Patterson v. DAC Corp., 66 N.C. App. 110, 115, 310 S.E.2d 783, 786
(1984); Haanebrink v. Meyer, 47 N.C. App. 646, 648, 267 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1980).
5. See cases cited supra note 4.
6. For a discussion of these criticisms, see infra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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cated borrowers by penalizing lenders who charge exorbitant interest rates.7
Given the tension between public policy and freedom of contract in commercial
transactions, one unresolved issue is whether courts should refuse to extend
usury laws and enforce the original contract rate when subsequent amendments
to usury laws bring the original bargained-for rate within the legal limit, or if
not, what interest rate, if any, the lender should be allowed to recover. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals recently considered this issue in Merritt v.
Knox8 and concluded that it could not enforce the once-usurious, originally contracted-for interest rate.9 As a result, the court held the borrower liable for interest at the legal judgment rate. 10 The Merritt court, in effect, created and imposed

a judicial penalty on lenders and provided relief for borrowers in the absence of
statutory penalties.
This Note discusses the inherent tension between the public policies underlying usury laws and the restraining influences that interest-rate ceilings exert
over economic progress and parties' freedom to strike mutually advantageous
bargains.1 1 The Note examines the court's decision in Merritt to determine its
consistency with the public policy and historical underpinnings of North Carolina's usury laws and its probable effect on future loan transactions. 12 This Note
analyzes other jurisdictions' constructions of usury statutes and compares them
to the approach taken by the Merritt court. 13 The Note contends that, had the
court's analysis balanced the public policy considerations with the negative effect that usury laws have on parties' freedom of contract, the court would have
concluded that in some cases the contracted-for interest rate should be enforced.1 4 This Note proposes an analysis that balances these interests against
each other to create a rebuttable presumption that, absent unconscionablility,
contracts should be enforced at their bargained-for rates in the absence of statutory penalties.15
On December 14, 1977, James and Louise Knox obtained a 20,000 dollar
loan from O.C. Merritt for commercial development of property. 16 The Knoxes
executed a promissory note secured by a second deed of trust on the undeveloped property.1 7 The note provided for interest at twelve percent per annum
7. See Note, Usury Legislation-Its Effects on the Economy and a Proposalfor Reform, 33
VAND. L. REv. 199, 209-211 (1980) (modem arguments supporting usury laws are based on protection of the consumer and ensuring fair credit prices); see also Oeltjen, Usury: Utilitarianor Useless?,
3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 167, 206-07 (1975) ("Today's arguments [in favor of usury laws] are phrased
in such terms as 'economics,' 'unconscionability,' and 'bargaining disparity.' "). For a discussion of
the public policy underlying North Carolina's usury laws, see infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
8. 94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d 160 (1989).
9. Id. at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162.
10. Id. at 342-43, 380 S.E.2d at 162-63.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 49-59.

12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

92-93.
60-81.
94-95.
106-13.

16. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 341, 380 S.E.2d at 161.

17. Id.
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from the date of execution until paid' s and for attorney's fees in the amount of
fifteen percent of the balance due in an action to enforce the holder's rights in
the event of the borrowers' default.' 9 The principal was due and payable one
year from the date of execution. 20 After the Knoxes defaulted, O.C. Merritt filed
21
suit on November 18, 1987 to collect the balance due on the promissory note.
Under the usury statute in effect at the time of the execution of the note, the
twelve percent interest rate charged by Merritt exceeded the maximum legal
interest rate of ten percent per annum. 22 Notwithstanding the fact that the
promissory note's original interest rate was usurious, 23 the trial court granted
the plaintiff recovery of the unpaid principal plus the contract rate of twelve
percent interest until judgment 24 and eight percent interest thereafter until
paid.

25

The defendants appealed, contending that the trial court erred in ordering
payment of interest at the contract rate and in calculating the attorney's fee
award upon that amount.26 The plaintiff conceded that the court could not enforce the twelve percent contract rate in his favor.27 Both parties argued that
the balance due and attorney's fees should be based on the maximum legal rate
allowed by the statute (ten percent) at the time of the note's execution. 28
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the contracted-for rate was
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (Supp. 1977) (amended 1985).
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or other applicable law, the parties to a loan,
purchase money loan, advance, commitment for a loan or forbearance may contract in
writing for the payment of interest not in excess of:... (2) Ten percent (10%) per annum
where the principal amount is one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or less and is a
business property loan.
The statute defines a "business property loan" as:
[A] loan... secured by real property of the borrower which is held or acquired for sale,
lease or use in connection with the borrower's trade, business or profession... and the
proceeds of which are to be used for the purpose of either acquiring, refinancing or improving such real property or in connection with such trade, business or profession of the
borrower.
Id. The Knoxes planned to build houses on the property. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 3, Merritt,
94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d 160 (1989) (No. 8810SC815).
23. See supra note 22.
24. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 341, 380 S.E.2d at 161.
25. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 2, Merritt, 94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d 160 (1989) (No.
8810SC815). As it is today, the legal judgment rate at the time of the judgment in Merritt was eight
percent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (1986). The trial court also awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees in
the amount of 15% of the outstanding balance due. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 341, 380 S.E.2d at 161.
26. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 340, 380 S.E.2d at 161.
27. Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief at 5, Merritt, 94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d 160 (1989) (No.
8810SC815) ("[I]t would be contrary to the public policy of North Carolina to permit an excessive
rate to be charged on the promissory note in question."). But see infra text accompanying notes 9495 and 106-13 (proposing that contract rates be enforced in the absence of unconscionable
circumstances).
28. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 341, 380 S.E. 2d at 161; see Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 9-11,
Merritt, 94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d 160 (1989) (No. 8810SC815); Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief at 5,
Merritt, 94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d 160 (1989) (No. 8810SC815).
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void and unenforceable. 2 9 The court reasoned that the contract rate was con30
trary to public policy as reflected by the usury statute in effect at execution.

Although the court recognized that the lender was entitled to recover some interest because the statute of limitations barred the penalty of forfeiture, 31 it rejected the parties' arguments for applying the maximum legal rate. 32 Instead the
court treated the note as if the parties had not specified an interest rate and,
relying on the Uniform Commercial Code sections governing ambiguous
terms, 33 substituted the legal judgment rate 34 for the twelve percent bargainedfor rate.

35

The legislature raised the interest rate ceiling applicable to the type of loan
at issue in Merritt by statutory amendment in 1981.36 The amendment provides
that for loans with a principal amount of $25,000 or less, the maximum interest
rate is the greater of sixteen percent or the six month Treasury Bill plus six
37
percent rounded upward or downward to the nearest one-half of one percent.

At the time the Merritt plaintiff filed suit in 1987, the amended interest rate
ceiling had been in effect for more than six years. 38 Thus, under the subsequent
1981 statutory amendment, the twelve percent interest rate provided in the
promissory note was no longer usurious. The court rejected the proposition,
however, that the subsequent amendment to the usury law could validate the
interest provision.

39

29. "While the underlying debt is not affected, usury invalidates the provisions of a note which
provide for the payment of interest." Merfitt, 94 N.C. App. at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162 (citing In re
Castillian Apartments, 281 N.C. 709, 712, 190 S.E.2d 161, 162 (1972)).
30. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
31. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162.

32. Id.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-3-118(d), -122(4) (1986). For a full discussion of these sections, see
infra notes 86-87.
34. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 24-1 (1986) sets forth the legal judgment rate. See infra note 35.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89. The legal rate in effect at the time of execution
was six percent. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 24-1 (1965) (amended 1980). An amendment to § 24-1 raising
the legal rate to eight percent became effective on July 1, 1980. Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 1157, § 1,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 90, 90-91 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (1986)). Because the legal
judgment rate had changed after the time of the note's execution, the case also presented the question of which legal judgment rate to apply. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 342-43, 380 S.E.2d at 162. The
court concluded that the legal judgment rate in effect at the time of execution governed until the
effective date of the amendment changing the legal judgment rate; from the effective date onward,
the amended legal judgment rate was applicable. Id. at 343, 380 S.E.2d at 163.
36. Act of May 28, 1981, ch. 465, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 730, 730-31 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (1986)). The legislature further amended the statute in 1985 to provide
that the maximum interest rate could vary during the term of variable rate loans. Act of July 9,
1985, ch. 465, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 730, 730-31 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (1986)).

37. Id.
38. The amendment took effect 10 days after the date of ratification of May 28, 1981, and
Merritt filed suit on November 18, 1987.
39. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 341, 380 S.E.2d at 162. Other jurisdictions also have refused to
apply subsequent amendments to usury statutes retroactively. See, eg., Mapes v. Palo Alto Town
and Country Village, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 508, 509-10 (D. Nev. 1984) (mem.) (construing Nevada
law); U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. v. Brents, 676 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Hazen v. Cook, 55
Or. App. 66, 72, 637 P.2d 195, 199 (1981), rev'd on othergrounds, 293 Or. 232, 646 P.2d 33 (1982);
Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc. v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 476 S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (rex. Civ.
App. 1971).
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The court in Merritt relied on Pond v. Horne,4° an early decision of the
North Carolina Supreme Court, which held that a usurious interest rate in a

contract made under a statute which declared such agreements "wholly void"

was not revived by the subsequent repeal of the statute.4 1 The plaintift4 2 in Pond
brought suit against the borrower for payment of a bond that called for a usurious rate of interest under the statute in effect at execution. 4 3 The borrower contended that the usurious interest rate provision rendered the contract void. 44
The plaintiff argued that he had a right to recover because the usury statute
subsequently had been repealed. 4 5 The court reasoned that the statute rendered
the contract void at its inception, and thus, the subsequent repeal of the statute
46
could not validate the contract.
The North Carolina General Assembly has restricted significantly the
breadth and scope of usury statutes over the years. 47 Unlike the usury statute in
effect when Pond was decided, the current usury laws do not render usurious
contracts void. Two penalties for usury are available under the current statute:
forfeiture of the entire amount of interest due to the lender and recovery of twice
the amount of interest actually paid by the borrower.48 Thus, the Merritt court
40. 65 N.C. 84 (1871) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 87.
42. The plaintiff brought suit to enforce payment of a bond executed by the defendant-borrower
to the plaintiff's intestate. Id. at 84.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 86. The court stated that "the contract as alleged in the plea of usury by force of the
statute 'was and is wholly void in law,' and the subsequent repeal of the statute does not give vitality
to that which was dead, for.., the effect of the statute is 'passed and closed.'" Id. at 87.
47. North Carolina's first usury statute, the Act of 1741, rendered "utterly void 'all bonds,
contracts, and assurances whatsoever,... for the payment of any principal or money to be lent, or
covenanted to be performed, upon or for any usury, whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or
taken' interest in excess of the legal rate prescribed." Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors,
Inc., 243 N.C. 326, 330, 90 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1956) (quoting Act of 1741, ch. 28, Potter's Revisal of
1819 (repealed 1837)). For a history of usury laws generally, see F. RYAN, USURY AND USURY
LAWS (1924); Special Project, InterestRates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 Aiuz. ST. L.J.
61 (1981). For a history of usury laws in North Carolina generally, see Commercial Credit, 243 N.C.
at 330-33, 90 S.E.2d at 889-91; Comment, supra note 1, at 762-63. Early usury laws in North Carolina prohibited any lawsuits by lenders based upon a usurious agreement. See, eg., Act of 1741, ch.
28, Potter's Revisal of 1819 (repealed 1837); Revised Statutes of 1837, ch. 117 (repealed 1854);
Revised Code of 1854, ch. 114 (repealed 1875); Act of Feb. 22, 1875, ch. 84, Laws of 1874-75 87
(repealed 1877). Under the Act of 1874-75, a lender who was a party to a usurious contract lost his
right to recover the money loaned. See Commercial Credit,243 N.C. at 331, 90 S.E.2d at 889-90. If
the lender did recover, he was subject to a penalty of twice the amount of the recovery in a lawsuit
brought by any person. Act of Feb. 22, 1875, ch. 84, § 2, Laws of 1874-75 87, 87-88 (repealed 1877).
The prior statutes, with the exception of the Act of 1866, provided that the plaintiff in such a suit
was entitled to only one-half of the recovered amount; the other one-half went to the state. Commercial Credit, 243 N.C. at 331, 90 S.E.2d at 889-90. Moreover, a violation of the Act of 1874-75 was a
misdemeanor. Act of Feb. 22, 1875, ch. 84, § 3, Laws of 1874-75 87, 88 (repealed 1877). The Act of
1876-77 superceded the Act of 1874-75 and comprises a substantial part of the present North Carolina usury statute. Act of Feb. 12, 1877, ch. 91, Laws of 1876-77 147 (repealed 1907); see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 24-2 (1986).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2. The statute provides:
The taking, receiving, reserving or charging a greater rate of interest than permitted by this
chapter or other applicable law, either before or after the interest may accrue, when knowingly done, shall be a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note or other evidence of
debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. And in case a greater
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faced a different statutory interpretation issue when it determined the effect that
subsequent amendments to usury laws should have in modifying previously usurious interest rates.
The North Carolina Supreme Court articulated the public policy underlying the state's usury laws in Pinnix v. Maryland Casualty Co.49:
The policy of the Legislature in adopting statutes of usury is the pro-

tection of borrowers against the oppressive exactions of lenders.... So
long as the inclination to profit from man's adversity or necessity exists, a law limiting the rate of interest that the lender may charge the
borrower for the use of money will continue to be wholesome and ben-

eficial to society. 50
In CarolinaIndustrialBank v. Merrimon51 the court characterized borrowers as

"needy... victim[s] of... rapacious lender[s]. ' ' 52 This paternalistic concern for
borrowers has led the North Carolina courts to interpret usury statutes
53
broadly.
Despite the altruistic purposes underlying interest rate limitations in usury
statutes, 54 economists and legal scholars frequently have criticized these laws for

failing to achieve their aim of protecting borrowers55 and for the restraining

influence that they exert over commerical economic progress. 56 Moreover, interest rate ceilings conflict with the principle of freedom of contract because these
rate of interest has been paid, the person or his legal representatives or corporation by
whom it has been paid, may recover back twice the amount of interest paid in an action in
the nature of action for debt. In any action... to recover upon any such note or other
evidence or debt, it is lawful for the party against whom the action is brought to plead as a
counterclaim the penalty above provided for, to wit, twice the amount of interest paid as
aforesaid, and also the forfeiture of the entire interest.
Id.
49. 214 N.C. 760, 200 S.E. 874 (1939).
50. Id. at 768, 200 S.E. at 879.
51. 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
52. Id. at 340, 132 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218
Mo. App. 68, 70, 262 S.W. 425, 428 (1924)).
53. Examples of this approach are found in cases which adhere to the view that the substance
rather than the form of transactions controls, allowing courts to hold that such transactions are
usurious, regardless of what label the excessive charges bear. See, eg., Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 277 S.E.2d 360, aff'd on rehearing,304 N.C. 191, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); Sherrill
v. Hood, 208 N.C. 472, 181 S.E. 330 (1935); Polikoff v. Finance Serv. Co., 205 N.C. 631, 172 S.E.
356 (1934); Jonas v. Home Mortgage Co., 205 N.C. 89, 170 S.E. 127 (1933); Bundy v. Commercial
Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931).
54. See Note, supra note 7, at 211 ("[L]egislative objectives for usury laws, protecting the consumer and providing credit for public consumption at a fixed reasonable rate, are valid and commendable public purposes and proper subjects for government regulation.").
55. See Shanks, PracticalProblemsin the Application ofArchaic UsuryStatutes, 53 VA. L. REV.
327, 328-30 (1967) (characterizing usury statutes as "blunt instruments of social control"); Long,
Trends in Usury Legislation-CurrentInterest Overdue, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 325, 330 (1980) ("any
benefits of lower interest rates are offset by decreased availability of funds for lending, with the result
that would-be borrowers at the higher-risk end of the credit spectrum, typically those lower-income
persons whom the laws are intended to protect, are denied credit"); Note, supra note 7, at 217-18
("[lronically, the class most likely to resort to the illegal market includes the poor and uneducated
borrowers that present usury legislation attempts to protect.").
56. See Note, supra note 7, at 201-02 (noting the "almost uniform criticism of general [interest]
ceilings by economists"); J. BENTHAM, Defence of Usury, in WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (1843);
F. RYAN, supra note 47, at 60-62.

1990]

COMMERCIAL LAW

1027

ceilings restrict contracting parties from making a mutually advantageous bargain if it is in violation of the legislatively imposed rate.5 7 These concerns have
led commentators to generate numerous alternate proposals to traditional usury
statutes.5 8 Legislative response to these criticisms has taken the form of statutory exemptions to the legal rate for certain types of transactions and positive
grants of corporate power to various classes of lenders. 59
In view of the criticism leveled at interest rate ceilings 6° and in the interest
of promoting freedom of contract, other jurisdictions have sought to interpret
usury penalties narrowly. 61 As one court noted, "the historical aversion to usury
has given way to an aversion to harsh penalty statutes for usury being invoked
by borrowers seeking to avoid payment of their bargained-for debts."' 62 One approach courts have taken is to apply amendments to usury statutes retroactively
so as to preclude a defense or claim of usury. A subsequent statutory amendment that repeals or modifies a usury law and is held to apply retroactively is
similar in result to the statute of limitations that barred the claim of usury in
Merritt. Both situations require the judiciary to determine what interest rate
should be enforced in the absence of express legislative direction.
The United States Supreme Court applied an amendment to the usury laws
retroactively in the landmark case of Ewell v. Daggs.63 In Ewell, a lender
brought suit to foreclose a mortgage securing a note that under Texas law contained a usurious interest rate when executed. 64 After the lender made the loan
but before he initiated the suit, the Texas Legislature enacted an amendment
repealing all usury laws. 65 The Texas Legislature did not make the amendment
expressly retroactive. 66 The borrower asserted usury as a defense, contending
that the law in effect when the parties made the loan should govern and that the
App. 3d 47, 54, 510
57. See Sweeney v. Citicorp Person-To-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 157 Ill.
N.E.2d 93, 98, appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 576, 515 N.E.2d 127 (1987) ("[a]ll usury statutes are in
derogation of the common law and are a restriction upon the freedom of contract") (citation omitted). Bentham, an economist arguing against interest rate ceilings, stated:
[N]o man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to

be hindered, with a view to his advantage, from making such bargain, in the way of ob-

taining money, as he thinks fit: nor (what is a necessary consequence) anybody hindered
from supplying him, upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).

58. See, eg., Oeltjen, supra note 7, at 216-33 (discussing five proposals: "organized inaction,"
"loan sharking plus," "public utility," "free market system," and a "compromise" model); Note,
supra note 7, at 227-30 (proposing a modified free market approach); Note, An Ounce of Discretion
for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for Usury Laws, 65 YALE L.. 105, 107-10 (1955) (suggesting replacement of statutory fixed rate interest ceilings with a codified unconscionability standard which would enable courts to declare usurious those loans found to be harsh and
unconscionable).
59. See Comment, supranote 1, at 764-71 (discussing statutory exceptions applicable to certain
institutional lenders, residential loans, small loans, corporate borrowers, various credit unions, and
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans Administration).
60. For a discussion of these criticisms, see supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
61. See, eg., cases cited infra note 75.
62. Ward v. Hudco Loan Co., 254 Ga. 294, 296, 328 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1985).
63. 108 U.S. 143 (1883).
64. Id. at 144-45.
65. Id. at 148.
66. Id.
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repeal of the usury laws should not be applied retroactively. 67
The Supreme Court held that usury laws are penal in nature and that the
repeal of such laws without a savings clause operates retrospectively, cutting off
68

the defense of usury in all future actions, even for contracts previously made.
The Court rejected an argument that courts should give retroactive effect to an
amendment only when the prior usury law had made usurious transactions voidable as distinguished from void. 69 The Court determined that giving the amend-

ment retroactive effect neither deprived the parties of vested rights nor impaired
the obligation of contract. 70 The Court reasoned:

[T]he right of a [borrower] to avoid his contract is given to him by
statute, for purposes of its own, and not because it affects the merits of

his obligation; and that whatever the statute gives, under such circumstances, as long as it remains infieri, and not realized by having passed
into a completed transaction, may, by a subsequent statute, be taken

away. It is a privilege that belongs to the remedy, and forms no element in the rights that inhere in the contract. The benefit which he
has received as the consideration of the contract, which, contrary to
law, he actually made, is just ground for imposing upon him,
by subse71
quent legislation, the liability which he intended to incur.
Thus, under the principles the Supreme Court announced in Ewell, a borrower has a mere privilege, granted and sustained by the legislature, to avoid his
contractual obligation. 72 Upon suspension of this privilege by the repeal or
modification of the usury statute, the borrower must stand by his original
73
bargain.
A significant number of jurisdictions have relied on the reasoning of the
Ewell court to give retroactive effect to amendments of usury statutes;74 thus
they enforce interest rates in contracts that, although usurious when made, are
rendered nonusurious by a later amendment. 75 These holdings reflect the purely
67.. Id.
68. Id. at 150.
69. Id. at 148-49. Compare American Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Financial Affairs Management Co.,
20 Ariz. App. 479, 484, 513 P.2d 1362, 1367 (1973) (emphasizing that the statute in effect at the time
the loan was executed did not make usurious contracts void) with United Realty Trust v. Property
Dev. and Research Co., 269 N.W.2d 737, 743 n.11 (Minn. 1978) (attaching no significance to the
distinction between previously void or previously voidable agreements under the repealed statute).
70. Ewell, 108 U.S. at 150-51.
71. Id. at 151.
72. See American, 20 Ariz. App. at 484, 513 P.2d at 1367 ("the statute creates a privilege in the
borrower, that privilege being the ability to avoid paying the interest he has previously agreed to
pay").
73. "The modification of the statute removes the previously existing privilege to the extent of
the modification. The privilege ends when that which creates it ends. It can hardly be contended
that a borrower has a vested right in this privilege to avoid obligations he has previously voluntarily
assumed." Id.
.74. In American Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Financial Affairs Management Co., the Arizona
Court of Appeals rejected the characterization of its holding as "giving retrospective or retroactive
effect to the modified statute." Id. The court instead reasoned that "[t]he remedy or privilege given
by the prior statute dies with the prior statute-the new or modified statute acts 'in praesentl',
applying to presently pending actions which have not proceeded to final judgment." Id.
75. See, eg,, American Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Financial Affairs Management Co., 20 Ariz. App.
479, 513 P.2d 1362 (1973); Orden v. Crawshaw Mortgage & Inv. Co., 109 Cal. App. 3d 141, 167 Cal.
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statutory nature of usury claims and defenses and their inherent conflict with the
notion of freedom of contract. 76 Enforcing the contract according to its terms,
rather than permitting a borrower to avoid or alter performance based on a
defunct statute, prevents a borrower from obtaining a windfall at the expense of
77
the lender.
Clearly, when jurisdictions construe usury statutes narrowly and determine
the right to a remedy by the law in effect at the time the parties file suit, courts
decide the obligations of the parties to the contract primarily by their bargain.
78
As the United States Supreme Court stated in McNair v. Knott:

Placing the stamp of legality on a contract voluntarily and fairly
entered into by parties for their mutual advantage takes nothing away

from either of them. No party who has made an illegal contract has a
right to insist that it remain permanently illegal. Public policy cannot
be made static by those who, for reasons of their own, make contracts
beyond their legal powers. No person has a vested right to be permit79
ted to evade contracts which he has illegally made.

This approach also comports with the modem view disfavoring forfeit80

ures
and the criticism leveled at usury statutes from an economic
8
perspective. '
Against this background of seemingly irreconcilable tension between public
policy and economic reality, the Merritt court faced an interstice in the usury
Rptr. 62 (1980); Tel Serv. Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1969); Coe v. Muller,
74 Fla. 399, 77 So. 88 (1917); Sweeney v. Citicorp Person-To-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 157 M1.App.
3d 47, 510 N.E.2d 93, appeal denied, 116 Ill.
2d 576, 515 N.E.2d 127 (1987); Iowa Say. & Loan
Assoc. v. Heidt, 107 Iowa 297, 77 N.W. 1050 (1899); United Realty Trust v. Property Dev. &

Research Co., 269 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1978); Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 193
Miss. 432, 9 So. 2d 638 (1942); Farmland Enter., Inc. v. Schueman, 212 Neb. 342, 322 N.W.2d 665
(1982); Bokum v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 N.M. 143, 740 P.2d 693 (1987).
76. The Sweeney court, recognizing this tension, statd:
All usury statutes are in derogation of the common law and are a restriction upon the
freedom of contract. Thus, there is no usury in the absence of a law limiting the rate of
interest, and a particular rate of interest is illegal only if it exceeds the statutory limit
applicable in the particular case. There is also no constitutionally vested right to the defense of usury, and its repeal merely allows what was the original obligation of the parties
to be enforced.
Sweeney, 157 I1. App. 3d at 54, 510 N.E.2d at 98 (citation omitted). See also Williams, 193 Miss.
432, 439, 9 So. 2d 638, 640 ("Rights of action or defenses on account of usury are not a part of the
common law. They are solely the creations of statute, and such statutes are in the nature of regulations in the public interest.").
77. See Sweeney, 157 Ill.
App. 3d at 55, 510 N.E.2d at 98 ("The plaintiff here does not seek
protection from a usurious loan, but rather seeks only a windfall, authorized by the penalty section
of the statute. This hardly seems to be the type of situation intended to be covered by the usury
law.").
78. 302 U.S. 369 (1937).
79. Id. at 373 (footnote omitted).
80. See United Realty Trust v. Property Dev. & Research Co., 269 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Minn.
1978); Ward v. Hudco Loan Co., 254 Ga. 294, 296, 328 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1985) ("'Forfeitures and
penalties are not favored. Courts should construe statutes relieving against forfeitures and penalties
liberally so as to afford maximum relief.' ") (quoting Southern Discount Co. v. Ector, 246 Ga. 30, 30,
268 S.E.2d 621, 622 (1980) (per curiam)).
81. See generally Shanks, supra note 55, at 329-34 (criticizing usury laws for their ineffectiveness and negative effect on economic development); Note, supra note 7, at 212-18 (examining the
detrimental impact usury laws have on the cost and availability of credit).
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statute. The Merritt court correctly decided not to enforce a penalty barred by
the statute of limitations.8 2 The court faced a more difficult issue, however, in
deciding whether to apply the amendment retroactively. Resolution of this issue
entailed balancing two conflicting interests: (1) preservation of the public policy
behind usury laws by penalizing lenders who charge exorbitant rates to protect
unwary borrowers-versus (2) limiting the negative side-effects of usury laws,
which include restricting parties' freedom to contract.
The Merritt court held that the contract provision specifying a twelve percent interest rate was contrary to public policy and therefore void and unen83
forceable because it violated the usury statute in effect at the time of execution.
Yet recognizing that the borrower was not entitled to complete relief from pay84
ing interest because the statute of limitations barred the penalty of forfeiture,
the court treated the note as if the parties had not specified any interest rate.85
The court, relying on Uniform Commercial Code provisions addressing ambiguous terms, 86 substituted the legal judgment rate87 for the twelve percent interest
rate.8 8 The court concluded that "where the debtor of a usurious loan is not
entitled to the benefit of the statutory penalties, he is liable for interest at the
legal rate."8 9 The effect of this holding was to create and impose a judicial penalty upon the lender equal to the difference between the amount he expected to
realize under the terms of the note and the legal judgment rate.90 Correspondingly, the court relieved the borrower of his obligation to repay the loan as
promised, allowing the borrower a windfall to the extent the legal judgment rate
of interest was less than the contract rate. 9 1
82. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53(2), (3) (1983).
83. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162. See Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp.,
278 N.C. 523, 536, 180 S.E.2d 823, 831 (1971) (holding that an agreement made in contravention of
a usury statute was void); see also Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 203, 182 S.E.2d 389,
395 (1971) ("A provision in a contract which is against public policy will not be enforced."); Glover
v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 228 N.C. 195, 198, 45 S.E.2d 45, 47 (1947) ("[A]greements are against
public policy when they tend to the violation of a statute."); Cauble v. Trexler, 227 N.C. 307, 311, 42
S.E.2d 77, 80 (1947) ("The purpose of the statute becomes a public policy.").
84. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 342-43, 380 S.E.2d at 162. The court cited N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-118(d) (1986)
("Unless otherwise specified a provision for interest means interest at the judgment rate at the place
of payment from the date of the instrument, or if it is undated from the date of issue."); N.C. GeN.
STAT. § 25-3-122(4) (1986) ("Unless an instrument provides otherwise, interest runs at the rate provided by law for a judgment.").
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (1986) sets forth the legal judgment rate. Neither of the Uniform
Commercial Code sections cited in note 86 nor their respective official comments speaks directly to
contract terms voided by judicial decision. The North Carolina comment to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 253-122(4) (1986) provides that "GS 25-3-118(d) is a construction section. regarding an instrument
which provides for interest, but states no rate or time" and "GS 25-3-122(4) is a procedural section
regarding interest on non-interest-bearing obligations."
88. Merritt, 94 N.C. App. at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162.
89. Id.
90. In Merritt this penalty was six percent of the unpaid balance from December 14, 1977, the
date of execution, until the date the legal judgment rate was raised, July 1, 1980. From July 1, 1980,
the penalty amount was four percent. These percentages reflect the difference between what the
lender contracted for under the terms of the loan agreement and the amount the court allowed him
to recover after applying the legal judgment rate. Further, the court lessened proportionally the
lender's attorney's fee award.
91. See supra note 90.
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The approach taken by the Merritt court, in providing judicial relief to borrowers by declaring contract rates void when they violate usury statutes in effect
at the time of execution and replacing them with the legal judgment rate, has
several advantages. The Merritt holding provides a bright-line test for determining whether a contracted-for interest rate is unenforceable and supplies a predictable remedy. Lower courts will find the Merritt approach simple to
administer and contracting parties are assured certain results under similar contracts. Moreover, the Merritt holding accords with the public policy underlying
usury statutes by protecting unwary, unsophisticated borrowers against unscrupulous, overreaching lenders. 92 The court's assertion that "the law would be
treacherous to itself if it were to allow the enforcement of the forbidden usurious
contracts because no penalty was attached" reflects this concern for the borrower. 93 Finally, under the remedy structured by the Merritt court, as between
the innocent borrower and the culpable lender, the windfall of a lower rate goes
to the borrower.
Although there exist some slight advantages from voiding the original contract rate and not applying usury amendments retroactively, the better analysis
would be to presume that, in the absence of the usury ceiling at the time of
execution, the parties would have bargained for the contract rate. The court,
therefore, presumptively should enforce the contract as written absent some
other principle of law for acting to the contrary. If the court views the contract
as unconscionable, then it should not enforce the contract rate but should apply

the legal judgment rate instead.
The facts in Merritt involved a sophisticated borrower, a commercial transaction, and a loan rate only two percent above the legal maximum, all of which
indicates no lack of equal bargaining power. The Merritt court, therefore, could
have enforced the contract rate while remaining consistent with the public policy of protecting unwary borrowers. Had the Merritt court applied this analysis
instead of creating a bright-line rule, it could have minimized the negative impact usury laws have on parties' freedom of contract while continuing to permit
judicial relief for borrowers in unconscionable bargains. The weakness in the
Merritt court's decision was determining that the contracted-for interest rate
was void and contrary to public policy without taking into consideration how
economic circumstances and public policy standards had changed between the
94
time the parties entered into the loan and when the court adjudicated the suit.
Instead of taking the opportunity to examine the contract for oppressive and
unfair terms, the circumstances of the bargain itself, and the necessity of protecting this particular borrower, the Merritt court automatically concluded that the
contracted-for interest rate was void and unenforceable and that the borrower
92. For a discussion of the public policy considerations
laws, see supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
93. Hughes v. Boone, 102 N.C. 137, 164, 9 S.E. 286, 293
94. For a discussion of the statutory amendment to N.C.
interest rate ceiling, see supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
change in the economic market and indicates that interest rates
no longer impose a hardship on debtors.

supporting North Carolina's usury
(1889).
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 increasing the
Such an increase arguably reflects a
previously considered excessive may
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should be granted relief.95 In short, the court viewed protection of the borrower
as completely inconsistent with freedom of contract.
The court in Merritt summarily disposed of the retroactivity issue in one
sentence, citing Pond v. Home as authority. 96 The Merritt court's automatic reliance on the holding in Pond 97 deserves closer scrutiny in light of the fundamental differences between the usury statutes in effect when the court decided Pond
in 1871 and those in effect today. The usury statutes at issue in Pond rendered
usurious contracts completely void whereas current usury statutes do not make
the underlying loan obligation unenforceable. 98 The Pond court based its reasoning on the fact that the repealed usury statute made the usurious transactions
void. 99 Thus, the court in Merritt faced an entirely different statutory construction issue.
Furthermore, the language of the legislature arguably does not support the
court's refusal retroactively to apply the 1981 statutory amendment to the previously executed loan.l °° But even if interpreted to bar the application of the
amendment to a previously executed agreement, 10 1 the amendment at least indicates the level at which lender "rapaciousness"'10 2 becomes intolerable and at
what point public policy must protect borrowers.10 3 Thus, amendments to usury
statutes, although they may not directly apply to previously executed contracts,
should serve as guidelines for courts in determining what interest rates are unreasonably excessive under current economic conditions.
Had the Merritt court construed the usury statute narrowly, as did the
Ewell court and its successors,1 ° 4 automatically to preclude the borrower from
presenting his case for equitable relief, the holding would have contradicted
courts' traditional antipathy for usurious contracts. Construing usury statutes
narrowly, by applying modifications to usury statutes retroactively or by denying borrowers relief past the statute of limitations period and thereby validating
contracts according to their terms, fails to protect uninformed borrowers from
overreaching lenders. 10 5 Moreover, a narrow construction does not take into
account the relative bargaining power of the parties. In short, a narrow construction approach based on the freedom to contract in the absence of statutory
95. See Merritt, 94 N.C. App at 342, 380 S.E.2d at 162.
96. Id. at 341, 380 S.E.2d at 162 (citing Pond v. Home, 65 N.C. 84 (1871) (per curiam)) ("Subsequent changes in the law regarding interest rates could not validate the interest provision.").

97. For a full discussion of Pond, see supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
98. See Comment, supra note 1, at 762 ("No longer is a usurious contract wholly void.").
99. Pond v. Home, 65 N.C. 84, 86 (1871) (per curiam).

100. Compare Act of May 28, 1981, ch. 465, § 3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 730, 730 (codified as
amended as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (1986)) ("[Tjhis act shall become effective 10 days after
ratification") with Act of July 9, 1985, ch. 465, § 3, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 849, 850 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (1986)) ("This act is effective upon ratification [July 9, 1985] and shall apply to
loans made after that date.") (emphasis added).
101. See supra note 100.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 63-77.
105. See Note, supra note 58, at 108 (arguing that repeal of usury statutes would "leave the
borrower without effective protection from usurious loan contracts").
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limitations does not serve the protective functions of the public policy approach.
Courts can remedy these disadvantages, however, by superimposing an unconscionability' 0 6 standard upon all interest rates provided for by contract.' 0 7 In
effect, this unconscionability standard would act as a "safety net" in the event a
borrower obtained an unjust result because the running of the statute of limitations or a subsequent modification or repeal of the usury law abridged the statutory penalties.' 0 8 Such an unconscionability standard is supported by the
traditional common-law doctrine that courts will not enforce an unconscionable

contract.1° 9
Under the combined freedom of contract/unconscionability approach, the

court would undertake a two-level analysis, balancing the need to protect the
borrower who is denied statutory relief with the economic consequences inher-

ent in enforcing the contract as written. The first level would employ the rea-

soning of Ewell and its progeny110 to create a rebuttable presumption that the
court should enforce the contract according to its terms in the absence of a
present statutorily granted claim or defense of usury. The second level would

allow the trier of fact to assess the equitable principles involved in enforcing the
contract as written. At this level, the inquiry would focus on the "arms' length"
nature of the transaction,' 11 the nature and amount of the loan,112 and the inter-

est rate itself. The threshold of unconscionability would be lower in transactions
that involve parties of unequal bargaining power or sophistication, personal

loans (as compared to business loans), or contracts with exorbitant rates of
interest.
In view of the adverse economic consequences that attend the imposition of

interest rate ceilings and the restrictions such ceilings place on the freedom of
106. In Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889), the Supreme Court defined an "unconscionable" contract as: "Such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Id. at 411.
107. One commentator, proposing an unregulated credit market, suggests that states implementing this system use a "streamlined unconscionability standard." Note, supra note 7, at 223. "Unconscionability" would be defined as "a rate of interest above the market rate procured through
overreaching." Id.
108. One commentator has advocated replacing fixed interest rate ceilings with an unconscionablity standard that would enable courts to declare any loan transaction usurious if the contract rate
is excessive and the loan, taken as a whole, is harsh and unconscionable. Note, supra note 58, at 108.
Commentators have praised this approach as providing an "appealing compromise between freedom
of contract, an unrestricted credit marketplace, and provisions for consumer protection." Note,
supra note 7, at 221-22. Potential problems with this scheme include high administrative costs and
the "uncertainty inherent in the unconscionability standard." Id. at 222.
109. See Long, supra note 55, at 337 (contending that even if no legal interest rates are set
"[b]orrowers are protected.., by the common law principle that equity will not enforce an unconscionable contract"). Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code codifies this principle for sales contracts. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 63-77.
111. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (The
court, discussing unconscionability in the context of contracts for the sale of goods, stated that
unconscionability included: "[A]n absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.").
112. See Note, supra note 7, at 227-28 (identifying individuals who borrow small amounts of
money for personal consumption as the class of borrowers that is most often subject to abuses by
unscrupulous lenders because of the needy circumstances, lack of sophistication, and poor bargaining ability of such borrowers).
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parties to strike a mutually advantageous bargain, the Merritt court's automatic
substitution of the legal judgment rate of interest for the contract rate without
considering the equitable factors involved creates a perilous precedent. When
faced with loan transactions in which no statutory penalty exists for usury and a
rate no longer deemed usurious under the law in effect at the time suit was filed,
the court should create a rebuttable presumption that borrowers are bound according to their contracted-for obligations. A judicial determination of unconscionability, as evidenced by the parties' unequal bargaining power, the nature
and amount of the loan, and the interest rate itself, could overcome this presumption. This two-step inquiry would allow North Carolina courts the flexibility to provide judicial relief' 13 when necessary to protect vulnerable borrowers,
thus effectuating the public policy against usury, while promoting the economic
development and freedom of contract essential to a free market system.
SUSAN PANNELL MCALLISTER

113. The Merritt holding would provide a guideline for such relief. For a discussion of the relief
provided in Merritt, see supra text accompanying notes 83-89.

